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Is there a ‘right to be forgotten’ in Canada’s Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
(PIPEDA)?
Michael Rosenstock*
INTRODUCTION
In May 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the EU Court)
held that internet search engines must remove search results that link to nondefamatory information about an individual that are ‘‘no longer necessary in the
light of the purposes for which they were collected or processed.” 1 The Court
stated that this test would likely be met when the information was inaccurate,
inadequate, irrelevant, excessive, or out-of-date.2 Importantly, even though the
search results that satisfy this test would be removed, the underlying content
would remain on the internet.3
Google Spain was widely viewed as formally recognizing an individual’s
‘‘right to be forgotten” on the internet,4 and led Google5 and other search
engines6 to implement processes through which individuals could seek the
removal of information from internet searches conducted in Europe. In the eight
months following the decision, 175,000 people applied to Google for the removal
of 600,000 internet links. The search engine approved about 40% of those
requests.7 Beyond this response, the decision has potentially far-reaching
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B.A., M.A., J.D. The author is currently a Judicial Law Clerk at the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice in Toronto. This article is written in a personal capacity and does not in
any way reflect the views of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice or the Ministry of the
Attorney General. The author can be contacted at michael.j.rosenstock@gmail.com.
Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Proteccio´n de Datos (AEPD)
and Mario Costeja González (May 13, 2014), Doc. C-131/12 (European Court of Justice
(Grand Chamber)) at para. 93 [Google Spain].
Ibid at paras. 92-93.
Ibid at para. 62.
See e.g. Alan Travis and Charles Arthur, ‘‘EU court backs ‘right to be forgotten’: Google
must amend results on request”, The Guardian (13 May 2014), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/may/13/right-to-be-forgotten-eu-court-google-search-results>.
Google Inc., ‘‘Search removal request under data protection law in Europe”, online:
<https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch&hl=en>.
See e.g. Bing, ‘‘Request to Block Bing Search Results In Europe”, online: <https://
www.bing.com/webmaster/tools/eu-privacy-request>.
Google Inc., ‘‘Transparency Report — European Privacy Requests for Search
Removals”, online: <https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy>.
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implications for the ways in which the internet is used to disseminate
information.
One view of Google Spain is that it reflects law and policy unique to Europe.
Indeed, the decision was based largely on an exercise in statutory interpretation
of European Directive 95/46/EC, which is aimed at ensuring data processing
systems protect privacy rights.8 Further, the Directive is considered a relatively
‘‘robust” application of Fair Information Practices, 9 a common privacy
framework developed through the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) and implemented differently throughout the world. 10
Finally, the Directive11 and the EU Charter12 establish privacy rights as
‘‘fundamental freedoms”, which is viewed as a response to Europe’s history with
communist and fascist regimes that made extensive and malevolent use of
personal information.13
However, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA)14 also establishes a privacy right with respect to
personal information based on the Fair Information Practice framework, 15 and
imposes similar obligations on organizations that collect, use or disclose personal
information. Moreover, Canadian courts have recognized the ‘‘quasiconstitutional” status of privacy rights.16 Thus, while the general consensus
appears to be that a right to be forgotten does not exist in Canadian law, some
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See EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, [1995] OJ, L 281/31 at Art 1 [Directive].
Lisa M Austin, ‘‘Enough About Me: Why Privacy is About Power, Not Consent (or
Harm)” at 136 in Austin Sarat, ed., A World Without Privacy? (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2015).
OECD, Recommendations of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (23 September 1980), online:
<www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#recommendation>; See also Austin (2015), ibid at
136.
Directive, supra note 8 at Preamble (2) and Art 2.
EC, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ, C 364/01 at Art 11
[EU Charter].
Jeffrey Toobin, ‘‘The Solace of Oblivion”, The New Yorker (29 Sep 2014), online:
<www.newyorker.com> (quoting Viktor Mayer-Schönberger).
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[PIPEDA].
Austin (2015), supra note 9 at 136.
See e.g. UFCW, Local 401 v. Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2013 SCC
62, 2013 CarswellAlta 2210, 2013 CarswellAlta 2211, (sub nom. Alberta (Information and
Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 401) [2013] 3
S.C.R. 733, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62 (S.C.C.) at para. 22 [Alberta Privacy Commissioner]. See
also Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway, 2004 FC 852, 2004 CarswellNat 1842, 2004
CarswellNat 3545, [2005] 2 F.C.R. D-32, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1043 (F.C.) at para. 100.
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have speculated that there may be a ‘‘legitimate case” for a similar result in
Canada.17
In this paper, I argue that PIPEDA could support a version of the right to be
forgotten, subject to three important caveats. First, for search engines to meet
the threshold applicability test under PIPEDA, their activities (i.e., crawling,
indexing, organizing, etc.) must constitute the ‘‘collection, use or disclosure” of
personal information. Ascribing such a role to search engines in information
dissemination would likely require a court to distinguish the activities of search
engines from hyperlinks on websites, which the Supreme Court in Crookes v.
Newton determined did not involve control over content.18 Second, PIPEDA’s
‘‘all-or-nothing approach”19 means that if search engines met the threshold test,
a series of obligations would be imposed on them regardless of their practicality,
suitability or intelligibility. One of these obligations — to which exemptions are
limited — would require search engines to obtain (and maintain) consent from
individuals to collect, use or disclose their personal information. A court may
react to the significant challenges of ‘‘fitting” PIPEDA to search engines by
rejecting the application of PIPEDA at the threshold stage. Third, as the breadth
of the right to be forgotten articulated in Google Spain would likely infringe the
‘‘core” of Canadian Charter protections for freedom of expression, one would
expect any right recognized under PIPEDA to be far narrower than that under
the Directive.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes and contrasts the EU
Directive and PIPEDA; Section 3 reviews and critically assesses Google Spain;
Section 4 examines whether a right to be forgotten could be discovered in
PIPEDA; Section 5 concludes.

I. THE EU DIRECTIVE AND CANADA’S PIPEDA
Both the EU Directive and PIPEDA establish a right of privacy with respect
to the processing of personal information.20 As noted in the introduction, the
Directive (and the EU Charter) characterizes this right as a ‘‘fundamental right”,
whereas PIPEDA makes no such express claim. Both legislative frameworks
define ‘‘personal data” (Directive) or ‘‘personal information” (PIPEDA) broadly
to mean information about an identifiable individual, without regard to whether
17
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See Andre Mayer, ‘‘‘Right to be forgotten’: How Canada could adopt similar law for
online privacy” CBC News (16 June 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca> (Quoting lawyer
Kristen Thompson); Justin Ling, ‘‘Forget me, Google”, National (May 2014), online:
<www.nationalmagazine.ca>. See also John Wunderlick, ‘‘A Limited Empowerment”
(June 2014) Privacy Journal 1 at 4.
Crookes v. Wikimedia Foundation Inc., 2011 SCC 47, 2011 CarswellBC 2627, 2011
CarswellBC 2628, (sub nom. Crookes v. Newton) [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269, [2011] S.C.J. No. 47
(S.C.C.) at para. 26 (per Abella J) [Newton].
Lisa M Austin, ‘‘Reviewing PIPEDA: Control, Privacy and the Limits of Fair
Information Practices” (2006) 44 Can Bus LJ 21 at 28.
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s. 3; Directive, supra note 8 at Art 1(1).
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the personal information is publicly available.21 If the activity falls within the
scope of the Directive or PIPEDA, the legislative frameworks impose a range of
obligations. I discuss the threshold question before turning to the substantive
obligations. For convenience, Table 1 in the Appendix reproduces and compares
the relevant sections of the Directive and PIPEDA.

(a) Threshold questions
Arguably where the Directive and PIPEDA exhibit the most differences
relates to the threshold questions of application and jurisdiction: whether the law
applies to the organization and the kinds of activities it engages in (application),
and the extent to which the law applies to organizations that operate outside of
Canada or Europe (jurisdiction or ‘‘territoriality”). The concepts of application
and jurisdiction are intertwined as they rely on the same statutory provisions and
terminology.
Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive together define the criteria for the Directive
to apply and for an EU Member State to assert jurisdiction. Article 3 states that
the Directive will apply to ‘‘the processing of personal data wholly or partly by
automatic means.”22 The processing of personal data is defined broadly as ‘‘any
operation. . .performed upon personal data”, and includes collection, use and
disclosure and over ten additional activities (e.g., recording, storage, retrieval,
and ‘‘making available”).23 Article 4 lists connecting factors that authorize a
Member State to assume jurisdiction over the processing of personal data. The
most relevant connecting factor to this paper is that jurisdiction can be assumed
when the processing of personal data is ‘‘carried out in the context of the
activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member
State.”24 A controller is defined as the person that ‘‘determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data.”25
Section 4 of PIPEDA provides that the statute applies ‘‘to every organization
in respect of personal information that . . . the organization collects, uses or
discloses in the course of commercial activities.”26 PIPEDA thus applies to a
narrower set of activities than the Directive: PIPEDA imposes a commercial
character requirement, and only three of the activities (‘‘collects, uses or
discloses”) identified by the Directive fall under the scope of PIPEDA.27
21

22
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24
25
26
27

Directive, supra note 8 at Art 2(a); PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s. 2 (‘‘personal
information”); Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Interpretation
Bulletin — Personal Information” (2013), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/
interpretations_02_e.asp>.
Directive, supra note 8 at Art 3(1).
Ibid at Art 2(b).
Ibid at Art 4(1)(a).
Ibid at Art 2(d).
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s. 4(1)(a).
See ibid at 2 (‘‘commercial activity”).
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PIPEDA does not establish the conditions for the assumption of jurisdiction.
‘‘Organization” is defined to include a corporation, but does not require that, for
example, the company be incorporated in Canada, or collect, use or disclose
personal information within Canadian borders.28 The issue of jurisdiction is thus
left to statutory interpretation in combination with common law principles —
specifically the ‘‘real and substantial connection” test.29 The effect of these
differences is that PIPEDA may have greater extraterritorial reach than the
Directive.
The Directive and PIPEDA also contain a number of across-the-board
exemptions. Most prominently, both legislative frameworks fully exclude the
processing of personal data (Directive) or the collection, use or disclosure of
personal information (PIPEDA) solely for journalistic, artistic or literary
purposes. Given the significant restrictions imposed on this exemption (i.e.,
‘‘solely”), the exemptions are not available to search engines, 30 although the
exemption is available to the operators of many of the underlying websites listed
in search results (e.g., websites of media organizations).31

(b) Substantive obligations
If the threshold criteria are met, both the Directive and PIPEDA impose a
range of obligations, the most significant of which is the requirement that
individual consent be obtained before processing personal data or collecting,
using or disclosing personal information.32 While both legislative frameworks
provide exemptions to the consent obligation, the exemptions contained in the
Directive are broader and more flexible. Article 7(f) of the Directive permits
personal data to be processed without consent when it is ‘‘necessary for the
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller”, unless those
legitimate interests are ‘‘overridden” by fundamental freedoms (e.g., privacy
rights). Rather than subjecting the consent obligation to a balancing test,
PIPEDA lists several circumstances whereby consent is not required. The most
relevant of these circumstances is where the information is publicly available and
specified by the regulations.33 PIPEDA regulations specify the following classes
of information: name and contact information published in telephone and
business directories; information from a registry ‘‘collected under a statutory
authority”; information disclosed in legal proceedings associated with a judicial
28
29

30

31
32

33

Ibid at s. 2 (‘‘organization”).
See Lawson v. Accusearch Inc., 2007 FC 125, 2007 CarswellNat 247, 2007 CarswellNat
853, [2007] 4 F.C.R. 314, [2007] F.C.J. No. 164 (F.C.) at paras. 34, 38-43 [Lawson].
There may be an argument for the exclusion of Google News (a news aggregator) under
the journalistic exemption, a point that I leave for future research.
See PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s. 4; Directive, supra note 8 at Arts 8-9.
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at s. 7 and Sch 1 at s. 4.3; Directive, supra note 8 at Art 7(f).
Article 7 of the Directive establishes other exemptions to the consent obligation beyond
the scope of this paper.
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at ss 7(1)(d), 7(3)(h.1), 7(4), 7(5).
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or quasi-judicial body; and personal information that appears in a publication
‘‘where the individual has provided the information”. 34
Irrespective of whether the activity is exempted from the consent obligation,
both the Directive and PIPEDA impose a number of additional obligations that,
inter alia, limit the processing of personal information and ensure its accuracy.
The Directive states that personal data must be ‘‘adequate, relevant and not
excessive” and ‘‘accurate, and where necessary, kept up to date” in relation to the
purpose for which the data is collected.35 PIPEDA requires that the collection of
personal information is ‘‘limited to that which is necessary for the purposes
identified by the organization”, not collected ‘‘indiscriminately”, ‘‘retained only
as long as necessary” and be ‘‘accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary
for the purposes for which it is to be used.”36 Despite the differences in
terminology, a close comparison reveals that the obligations are substantively
similar. I refer to these obligations throughout this paper as the ‘‘accuracy and
use limitation obligations”.
The Directive and PIPEDA also provide similar remedies to individuals to
enforce privacy rights. Under Article 12 of the Directive and Principle 9 of
PIPEDA, individuals are provided a right to access their personal information
held by an organization and the right to challenge the organization on the
accuracy and completeness of that information.37 Inaccurate or incomplete data
must be corrected or erased, as appropriate. Where personal data are being
processed without an individual’s consent (i.e., through the exemption described
above), Article 14 of the Directive provides an additional right to individuals to
object to the processing on ‘‘compelling legitimate grounds.” 38 PIPEDA does not
provide a similar right of objection, but as noted above, the ability of
organizations to collect personal data without consent is more constrained.

II. THE GOOGLE SPAIN DECISION
(a) Overview
In Google Spain, Spanish resident Mario Costeja González filed a complaint
with the Spanish Data Protection Agency (AEPD) against Google Spain, Google
Inc. and a Spanish newspaper. Fifteen years earlier, the newspaper published an
announcement of a real estate auction to recover social security debts he owed,
and hyperlinks to the announcement appeared in a Google search of his name. 39
34

35
36
37
38

SOR/2001-7 at s. 1. Other exemptions are provided but are not relevant to this analysis.
See generally PIPEDA, ibid at s. 7(1). In addition, PIPEDA requires that the purposes
for personal information collection, use or disclosure be ‘‘appropriate in the
circumstances”: see PIPEDA, ibid at s. 5(3).
Directive, supra note 8 at Art 6(c) and (d).
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at Sch 1 at ss 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
Directive, supra note 8 at Art 12; PIPEDA, supra at Sch 1 s. 4.9.
Directive, ibid at Art 14(a).
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The publication was not alleged to be defamatory. Nevertheless, Costeja
González sought orders against the newspaper to delete the publication and
against Google to remove the publication from search results on the basis that
they conflicted with the Directive. The AEPD refused the request with regards to
the newspaper, but agreed to the order against Google. The decision was
appealed to the EU Court. The EU Court agreed substantially with the AEPD
and ruled that the Directive required Google to remove the newspaper
publication from search results.

(b) Interpretation of the Directive in Google Spain
In Google Spain, the EU Court was tasked with interpreting three aspects of
the Directive: application, jurisdiction, and the scope of the obligation on
Google.40 In the following discussion, note that any reference to ‘‘Google” refers
to Google Inc., the operator of the search engine based in the United States — as
opposed to Google Spain, a subsidiary incorporated in Spain to sell online
advertising to local firms.41

(i) Application
Google argued that the Directive ought not to apply because it was not
engaged in the ‘‘processing of personal data”: the search engine crawled and
indexed all of the information on the internet without regard to whether the
information was ‘‘personal data.”42 The EU Court rejected this argument. It
determined that at least some of the information ‘‘found, indexed and stored” by
search engines and listed in search results were personal data in that it related to
identified persons, and the definition does not require any differentiation
between ‘‘personal data” and other data. Further, the search engine’s activities
met the broad definition of ‘‘processing of personal data”: crawling webpages
constituted ‘‘collection”; indexing represented ‘‘retrieval”, ‘‘recording”,
‘‘organization” and ‘‘storage”; and listing the search results comprised
‘‘disclosure” and ‘‘making available” of personal data.43 (The EU Court made
no finding that Google ‘‘used” personal data.)

39
40
41
42
43

Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 14.
Ibid at para. 20.
See ibid at para. 44.
Ibid at para. 22.
Ibid at paras. 26-31. Although this was not made explicit in the decision, a search through
Google (or any other search engine) does not scour all the webpages of the internet in real
time. Rather, Google continuously crawls websites and builds an index of the internet.
Google searches are conducted on the index: See Google Inc., ‘‘How search works”,
online: <www.google.ca/insidesearch/howsearchworks/thestory> (Accessed 4 Nov
2014).
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(ii) Jurisdiction
Concluding that the search engine engaged in the ‘‘processing of personal
data” led the EU Court to find that Google was a ‘‘controller” within the
meaning of the Directive — through the crawling and indexing activities, the
search engine determined the ‘‘purposes and means” of the data processing. 44
The more difficult issue was whether the processing was ‘‘carried out in the
context of the activities of an establishment [Google Spain] of the controller
[Google].”45 Google argued that this could not be the case because its activities
were legally distinct from Google Spain.46 The EU Court held that because the
Directive employs the phrase ‘‘in the context of the activities” rather than ‘‘by the
activities”, Google Spain did not have to be a data processor to meet the terms of
the connecting factor.47 The fact that Google Spain sold advertising displayed in
Google searches — making the search function profitable — was sufficient to
establish the necessary context.48

(iii) Scope of obligation on Google
In determining the obligation on Google as a processor of personal data, the
EU Court rejected two arguments submitted by the search engine. First, Google
suggested that requests to erase content ought to be made exclusively to the
publisher of the underlying website. The EU Court held that Google was not a
passive information intermediary. Rather, it created content by permitting users
to obtain a ‘‘structured overview” of personal data and a ‘‘detailed profile of the
data subject” — information that would not be easily attainable without search
engines.49 Requiring the removal of content from individual webpages would
insufficiently protect privacy because the information contained in underlying
webpages could easily be duplicated, and media were exempted from the
Directive.50 Second, Google argued that ordering it to remove content violated
the ‘‘fundamental rights” (i.e., freedom of expression) of the search engine and
internet users.51 The EU Court agreed that internet users had a ‘‘legitimate
interest” in accessing information on the internet, but described the interests
served in the processing of personal data as largely economic.52 Given the
importance attached to privacy rights in the Directive and EU Charter 53, as a
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Google Spain, supra note 1 at paras. 32-34.
Directive, supra note 8 at Art 4(1)(a).
Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 51.
Ibid at para. 52 (emphasis added).
Ibid at paras. 52, 56.
Ibid at paras. 37, 80.
Ibid at para. 84-85.
Ibid at para. 63.
Ibid at para. 81.
See EU Charter, supra note 12 at Art 7 (Respect for private and family life) and Art 8
(Protection of personal data).
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‘‘general rule” the privacy rights would prevail over the economic interests of
Google.54
The EU Court interpreted Articles 12 and 14 as tasking the search engine
with evaluating and acting upon requests by EU residents to remove search
results, with recourse to domestic data regulators and the courts. Google must
remove search results that violate Article 6 of the Directive: that is, when the
search results are inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, excessive, not up-to-date, or
kept longer than necessary. 55 However, where the benefits of making
information accessible to the public more than offset the privacy infringement,
the balancing test contained in Article 7(f) requires Google to reject the
individual’s request. The EU Court held that the public would have a greater
interest in access to information when that individual played a more significant
role in public life.56 In other words, requests under the right to be forgotten
would be subject to a case-by-case assessment.
Applied to the facts of the case, the EU Court held that given the amount of
time that had passed since the real estate auction, the ‘‘sensitivity” of the
information to Costeja González’s private life, and the lack of public interest in
accessing such information, Google must remove the link to the newspaper
publication from the search results.57

(c) Analysis
This paper focuses on two related aspects of the Google Spain decision:
freedom of expression and the requirement that search engines administer
requests to delete search results.

(i) Freedom of expression
The most controversial aspect of Google Spain and the right to be forgotten
more generally relates to freedom of expression. American privacy scholar
Jeffrey Rosen labeled the right to be forgotten as the ‘‘biggest threat to free
speech on the Internet in the coming decade.”58 Other scholars and media,
particularly in the US, UK, and Canada, have expressed similar sentiment. 59
Freedom of expression received surprisingly little attention in Google Spain.
In fact, while citing the privacy protections contained in the EU Charter, the EU
Court did not make a single reference to Article 11, which states:

54
55
56
57
58
59

Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 81.
Ibid at paras. 79, 81, 94-99.
Ibid at para. 97.
Ibid at para. 98.
Jeffrey Rosen, ‘‘The Right to Be Forgotten” (2012) 64 Stan L Rev Online 88 at 88.
See e.g. Michael Geist, ‘‘‘Right to be forgotten’ ruling lacks balance”, Toronto Star (16
May 2014) B4; Juergen Baetz, ‘‘Media outlets cry censorship as Google removes certain
search results in Europe”, Globe and Mail (4 Jul 2014) B7.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers.60

Paradoxically, in reasoning that Google was a ‘‘controller” under the Directive,
the EU Court held that the search engine ‘‘plays a decisive role” in transmitting
information61 — the same factors which ought to have led the EU Court to
inquire into the impact of a right to be forgotten on freedom of expression.
Requiring a search engine to remove search results suppresses the capacity of
website publishers and internet users to ‘‘receive and impart information and
ideas.”62 Website publishers — including media organizations — whose
webpages are de-linked from search engine indexes are constrained from
reaching audiences (‘‘impart”). Likewise, internet searches would lead users to
incomplete or less relevant information (‘‘receive”). The significance of search
engines in communicating information should not be understated: a 2014 poll,
for example, found that half of Americans found their news through search
engines.63
The consequence of ignoring freedom of expression is that privacy rights are
protected as a ‘‘fundamental freedom”, while the interests of publishers and
internet users in search results are left unarticulated and hollow. A balancing test
that pits a fundamental freedom against something less (e.g., a commercial
interest) will almost always favour the fundamental freedom. Describing the
interests of website publishers and internet users in search results as a
‘‘fundamental freedom” would have significantly reshaped the balancing test,
making the outcome far less clear (and far more complex). This is not to say that
freedom of expression should necessarily defeat privacy rights, only that they
should factor significantly into the balancing exercise.
Beyond the legal analysis is a crucial normative question about the extent to
which information posted online should be indefinitely available and accessible.
In Google Spain, the complainant was unable to shed his bankruptcy troubles
60
61
62

63

EU Charter, supra note 12 at Art 11 (emphasis added).
See Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 36.
Others have argued for greater consideration of the public interest in accessing
information through search results. These include the Advocate General who brought
the case to the EU Court: Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL and
Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Proteccio´n de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
González (June 25, 2013), Doc. C-131/12 at paras. 120-125. See also Christopher Rees
and Debbie Heywood, ‘‘The ‘right to be forgotten’ or the ‘principle that has been
remembered’” (2014) 30:5 Computer L & Sec Report 574 at 578; Ann Cavoukian and
Christopher Wolf, ‘‘The web never forgets (nor should it)”, National Post (25 Jun 2014)
A13; Dominic McGoldrick, ‘‘Developments in the Right to be Forgotten” (2013) 13:4
Human Rights Law Review 761 at 766.
American Press Institute, ‘‘How Americans get their news” (17 Mar 2014), online:
<www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/how-americans-get-news>.
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from over a decade earlier. There are more compelling examples: a 73-year-old
teacher terminated after students learned through the Internet Movie Database
(IMBd) that she acted in erotic films in her twenties; 64 a sexual assault victim
seeking to remove her name from a news article describing the violence; 65 or a
high school student concerned about being denied university admission because
of a five-year-old ‘‘tweet”.66 Viktor Mayer-Schönberger argues that ‘‘digital
memory” has led to the end of forgetting, and endorses legal frameworks such as
the right to be forgotten as a means of encouraging forgiveness.67 This essay
cannot canvass this discussion in detail, but these issues are critical to
understanding the other side of the free speech debate.

(ii) Role of search engine
The decision to task Google with evaluating requests and deleting search
results has also been subject to significant criticism. A number of commentators
draw an analogy between search engines and libraries,68 and argue that forcing
Google to remove search results is akin to requiring libraries to remove titles
from electronic indices — which is antithetical to their purpose of providing users
with ‘‘materials from which they can make their own judgment.” 69 Ultimately
this criticism is rooted in a starkly different characterization of the role played by
search engines in information dissemination. The EU Court determined that
search engines do not simply make information easier to find: they permit users
to obtain a ‘‘structured overview” of a person that contains a ‘‘more or less
detailed profile.”70 Anyone that has searched their own name and found their
picture, employment history, or educational background on the first page of
search results would likely find some merit in this argument. Similar information
of the same quality and volume is not accessible from a library. 71 Whether or not

64

65

66

67

68

69
70

Graeme Hamilton, ‘‘Risqué film corpus used as dismissal grounds”, National Post (21
Oct 2014) A3.
See Google, ‘‘Examples of requests we encounter”, online: <https://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy>.
See Natasha Singer, ‘‘They Loved Your GPA Then They Saw Your Tweets”, New York
Times (9 Nov 2013), online: <www.nytimes.com>.
See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, ‘‘Omission of search results is not a ‘right to be
forgotten’ or the end of Google”, The Guardian (13 May 2014), online: <www.theguardian.com>; Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the
Digital Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012) at 4, 207-209.
Cavoukian and Wolf, supra note 62 at A13; ‘‘On being forgotten”, The Economist (17
May 2014), online: <www.economist.com>; David Drummond, ‘‘We need to talk
about the right to be forgotten”, The Guardian (10 Jul 2014), online: <www.theguardian.com>; Jodie Ginsberg, ‘‘Right to be forgotten: A poor ruling, clumsily
implemented”, Index on Censorship (3 Jul 2014), online: <indexoncensorship.org>.
But see Toobin, supra note 13 (quoting privacy advocate Marc Rotenberg).
Cavoukian and Wolf, supra note 62 at A13.
Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 37.
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a more significant role ascribed to search engines in information dissemination
provides normative justification for a right to be forgotten is a different matter.

III. A ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’ IN PIPEDA?
This section proceeds by analyzing each interpretive step necessary to
‘‘discover” a right to be forgotten within PIPEDA, based on the discussion in
Section 2. At each interval it is assumed that the preceding step is met. For
simplicity, and given the fact that Google’s share of the Canadian search engine
market is nearly 90%,72 I use Google throughout this section.

(a) Application — ‘‘Collects, uses or discloses. . .”
The EU Court held that Google’s crawling function constituted the
‘‘collection” of personal information, and the listing of search results
represented ‘‘disclosure.” 73 Unfortunately, decisions by the Privacy
Commissioner and courts under PIPEDA have had little reason to scrutinize
the definition of ‘‘collection, use or disclosure”. However, Canadian courts in
other contexts have hinted at a limited role for search engines in information
dissemination. In Newton, the Supreme Court held that a mere hyperlink on the
defendant’s website to defamatory content could not constitute defamation.
Writing for the majority, Justice Abella stated: ‘‘A reference to other content is
fundamentally different from other acts involved in publication. Referencing on
its own does not involve exerting control over the content.”74 Moreover, as the
defendant’s hyperlinking only communicated the existence of content, rather
than the content itself, the hyperlinking was ‘‘ancillary” to the underlying
publication.75
Newton provides some indication that a court may not ascribe the same role
to search engines as the EU Court. Although exercising control over personal
information is not a requirement of PIPEDA per se, control is closely linked
conceptually to the collection, use or disclosure of personal information. Indeed,
control is a central organizing principle of PIPEDA. Principle 1 of PIPEDA
states that ‘‘[a]n organization is responsible for personal information under its
control.”76 The control argument would also support Google’s position —
rejected in Google Spain — that by automatically crawling and indexing websites
71
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See Muge Fazlioglu, ‘‘Forget me not: the clash of the right to be forgotten and freedom of
expression on the Internet” (2013) 3:3 International Data Privacy LJ 149 at 152.
‘‘The Webcertain Global Search & Social Report 2014” (2014) at 15, online:
<globalcentral.net/assets/cb757434/1403168172_The_Webcertain_Global_Search_and_Social_Report_Q2_2014.pdf>.
Google Spain, supra note 1 at paras. 26-31. As I note in Section 2, the EU Court made no
finding regarding the ‘‘use” of personal information.
Newton, supra note 18 at para. 26 (per Abella J) (emphasis added).
Ibid.
PIPEDA, supra note 14 at Sch 1 at s. 4.1 (emphasis added).
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without regard to whether the information constituted ‘‘personal data”, Google
could not be processing personal data.77 In addition, describing hyperlinking as
ancillary to publishing suggests that search results may not constitute
‘‘disclosure” under PIPEDA.
However, caution should be exercised in drawing definitive conclusions from
Newton. Clearly the focus of the case was on the tort of defamation rather than
an interpretation of PIPEDA. The court was not asked to inquire into the
differences between hyperlinks from one website to another, and hyperlinks from
a search engine to a website: hyperlinks in search results are the product of the
search engine continuously crawling, indexing and organizing internet content.
Nor was the court asked to determine whether search engines create content by
generating a ‘‘structured profile” based on a search of a person’s name, and
providing a sorting function to internet users. Signals that courts may distinguish
search engines from ordinary websites may be found in Equustek Solutions Inc v
Jack,78 where the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a lower court ruling
— also in a different context — that ‘‘Google internet search websites are not
passive information sites” because, inter alia, the search site ‘‘collects a wide
range of information” including users’ IP addresses, location, search terms, and
‘‘click-throughs”.79 The court also referred to Google’s webcrawling software as
an ‘‘active process”.80 The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in this case,
potentially offering further guidance on the nature of search engines’ activities. I
refer to Equustek below in more detail in discussing jurisdiction.

(b) Application — ‘‘. . . in the course of commercial activities”
Google generated $55 billion in revenue in 2013, the vast majority of which
was derived from its online advertising system that allows advertisers to purchase
advertisements associated with specific search terms (‘‘Adwords”).81 The search
engine is thus undoubtedly a commercial activity. However, Google may argue
that search results are severable by type: because advertisers do not generally
associate advertisements with individuals’ names, little to no revenue is generated
by searches that retrieve personal information.82 In such searches, Google is not
77
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Google Spain, supra note 1 at para. 22.
Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2015 BCCA 265, 2015 CarswellBC 1590, 75 B.C.L.R.
(5th) 315, [2015] B.C.J. No. 1193 (B.C. C.A.) [Equustek], affirming 2014 BCSC 1063,
2014 CarswellBC 1694, 63 B.C.L.R. (5th) 145, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1190 (B.C. S.C.), leave
to appeal allowed 2016 CarswellBC 397, 2016 CarswellBC 398 (S.C.C.) [Equustek
(BCSC)].
Equustek (BCCA), supra note 78 at para. 52 affirming Equustek (BCSC), supra note 78
at paras. 48-49.
Equustek (BCCA), supra note 78 at para. 54.
Google Inc, ‘‘Form 10K — Annual Report 2013” (2013) at 26, online: <https://abc.xyz/
investor/pdf/20131231_google_10K.pdf> [Google 2013].
Based on multiple searches of names on ‘‘Google.ca”. It is possible for advertisers to
target advertisements based on user names.
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seeking to profit but instead delivering on its mission to ‘‘organize the world’s
information and make it universally accessible and useful.”83
An argument based on distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial components of the search function is difficult to sustain given that
search histories and ‘‘click throughs” are used to make the search engine more
efficient and better-performing for all internet users (i.e., by delivering more
relevant results), which subsequently attracts more users and advertisers. 84 The
phrase ‘‘in the course of” implies that it is not necessary that the search
corresponding to an individual’s name itself be a commercial activity. Indeed, in
a 2009 investigation into Facebook’s privacy practices, the Assistant Privacy
Commissioner determined that the phrase ‘‘in the course of commercial
activities” would incorporate the collection, use or disclosure of personal
information not directly tied to profit-making where the activities enhance user
experiences and encourage continued use, ‘‘indirectly contributing to the success
of [the organization] as a commercial enterprise”.85

(c) Jurisdiction
PIPEDA does not specify whether or to what extent the privacy obligations
attach to organizations located outside of Canada. The most significant case in
this regard is Lawson, where the federal court overturned the Privacy
Commissioner’s determination that PIPEDA did not grant her jurisdiction to
investigate a US-based company. Harrington J. held that where there was a
connection to Canada, the Privacy Commissioner had jurisdiction. 86 Later
Privacy Commissioner decisions have elaborated upon the connecting factors
between the organization’s activities and Canada sufficient to ground
jurisdiction, which include the residencies of the parties, and the location of
the activity, contract, host server, or end user.87
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Google 2013, supra note 81 at 25.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Canada (Privacy Commissioner),
2010 FC 736, 2010 CarswellNat 3689, 2010 CarswellNat 2225, [2010] 3 F.C.R. D-20,
[2010] F.C.J. No. 889 (F.C.) [State Farm], the Federal Court held that for PIPEDA to
apply, the ‘‘primary activity or conduct” in question must be of a commercial nature.
However, the test was only developed to distinguish activities that ‘‘support and promote
electronic commerce” from other activities such as litigation: see paras 104-105. As
search engines are deeply connected to electronic commerce, the State Farm test is
unlikely to apply.
Assistant Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Report of Findings into the Complaint
Filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC) against
Facebook Inc. Under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act” (PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-008) at para. 12.
Lawson, supra note 29 at paras. 43, 50.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Law School Admission Council
Investigation” (PIPEDA Case Summary #2008-389) at para. 42. See also Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Airline must ensure policies comply with Canadian
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On the one hand, Google operates in the United States and likely physically
processes and stores data outside of Canada. However, the collection, use or
disclosure of personal information relates to Canadian residents; the underlying
webpages would likely include Canadian sources; Google clearly targets
Canadian internet users (i.e., through Google.ca); and Google sells advertising
to Canadian companies, albeit through a subsidiary. Judging by other decisions
of the Privacy Commissioner, these connecting factors would be sufficient to
establish jurisdiction.88 For example, in KLM the airline was held to be subject to
PIPEDA because it served the Canadian market, had a website targeting
Canadians, and collected information on Canadian passengers in order to
provide services.89
Furthermore, a recent case involving Google points to a seemingly-expanded
legal understanding of jurisdiction over search engines. In Equustek (BCSC), the
plaintiff sought an injunction against Google to remove the defendant’s website
from all Google searches after the defendant continued to unlawfully use the
plaintiff’s trade secrets to manufacture a competing product. 90 Google
challenged the jurisdiction of the British Columbia Supreme Court to make
such an order.91 Fenlon J. held that because Google engaged British Columbia
residents through features such as predictive search and various forms of
information collection (e.g., location tracking), 92 and sold advertising to British
Columbia firms, Google carried on a business in the province — satisfying the
‘‘real and substantial” connection test specified by s. 10(h) of the British
Columbia Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA).93 In coming
to this conclusion, Fenlon J. disregarded the legal distinction between Google
and Google Canada, finding the two ‘‘inextricably linked” through the
‘‘Adwords” service.94
The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision but
differed to some extent in its approach to the question of jurisdiction. 95
Groberman J.A. held that s. 10 of the CJPTA was not necessary to establish the
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privacy law” (PIPEDA Report of Findings #2011-002) [KLM]; Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Cloud Computing — Factsheet” (2011).
This view is also consistent with others that have commented on the Google Spain
decision. See e.g. Geist (2014), supra note 59 at B4 (Stating that the EU Court’s decision
to assume jurisdiction over Google was not ‘‘particularly surprising” and that ‘‘Canada
maintains that its privacy laws apply to organizations outside the country that collect,
use or disclose personal information of Canadians”).
KLM, supra note 87 at para. 5.
Equustek (BCSC), supra note 78 at paras. 6-8.
Ibid at paras. 9, 11.
Ibid at para. 48.
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 28.
Equustek, supra note 78 at para. 63.
See Equustek (BCCA), supra note 78 at para. 43.
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court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter (‘‘territorial competence”) because the
‘‘facts concerning the violation of trade secrets and of intellectual property rights
. . . have a strong connection to the Province.”96 However, Groberman J.A.
relied on Fenlon J.’s findings about Google’s business and information collection
in British Columbia to ground in personam jurisdiction over the company.97
Groberman J.A. stated that Google’s concerns that the decision would leave it
governed by courts around the world is a function of ‘‘the world-wide nature of
Google’s business and not any defect in the law that gives rise to that
possibility.”98

(d) Substantive obligations and rights
If the threshold tests are met, PIPEDA would subject Google to the consent
obligation and in addition, to the accuracy and use limitation obligations. This
paper proceeds by examining whether these obligations could be interpreted so as
to give rise to a right to be forgotten, before turning to how the obligations may
be shaped by the constitutional guarantee to freedom of expression.

(i) Consent obligation
As noted in Section 2, Article 7(f) of the Directive provides a balancing test
relieving data processors from the consent obligation where the activities
advance ‘‘legitimate interests”.99 No similar balancing test is available under
PIPEDA, raising significant interpretive challenges as Google would have to
remove search results containing personal information for which it does not
obtain or sustain consent to collect, use or disclose.
Implied consent — the notion that consent ‘‘may reasonably be inferred from
the action or inaction of the individual”100— is authorized by PIPEDA and is
capable of mitigating many of the concerns associated with obtaining initial
consent to collect, use or disclose personal information, particularly for search
results containing non-sensitive personal information. 101 However, the more
difficult issue for the purposes of this article is not how a search engine might
obtain initial consent, but what happens if consent is withdrawn. PIPEDA
provides that consent may be withdrawn at any time.102
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Ibid at para. 41.
Ibid at para. 51.
Ibid at para. 56.
Directive, supra at Art 7(f).
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Determining the appropriate form of
consent under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act”
(2004), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/resource/fs-fi/02_05_d_24_e.asp>. See also
Austin (2006), supra note 19 at 32 (discussing implied consent and PIPEDA).
See PIPEDA, supra note 14 at Sch 1, s. 4.3.4.
Ibid at Sch 1, s. 4.3.8.
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Some of the challenges associated with the withdrawal of consent are
mitigated by the exemptions to the consent requirement under PIPEDA. Where
the terms of the exemption are met, consent could not be withdrawn because it is
not required in the first place. The relevant exemption is triggered where personal
information is publicly available and specified by the regulations. While all
information retrieved through Google search is publicly available, only a limited
number of classes of information are specified by the regulations. The effect of
this exemption is that consent is not required (and could not be withdrawn) for
personal information contained in business directories (e.g., links to LinkedIn
profiles), disclosed in legal proceedings (e.g., lawsuits or convictions), and
appearing in a publication ‘‘where the individual has provided the
information”103 (e.g., articles containing quotes given by an individual, and
possibly links to Facebook profiles or pictures posted by an individual).
However, the exemption does not cover all — or even a majority — of the search
results that contain personal information. News articles, for example, frequently
contain personal information that have not been provided by individuals.104
The above analysis suggests PIPEDA is poorly suited to the search engine
context. For those search results that are not subject to the exemption, the
consent obligation could permit individuals to shape their own search results by
withdrawing consent to search results with unfavourable information. The
outcome could be a right to be forgotten far broader in scope than the version
articulated by the EU Court, completely divorced from the privacy objective, and
costly in terms of freedom of expression.
This analysis also supports Lisa Austin’s characterization of PIPEDA as an
‘‘all-or-nothing approach”: once the threshold test is met, the organization must
‘‘comply with all ten principles” even where it ‘‘makes sense to require
compliance with only a subset of these principles.”105 Austin argues that the
impact of this lack of ‘‘nuance” is that the Privacy Commissioner or courts may
narrowly interpret the threshold question so as not to give rise to the impractical
or nonsensical substantive obligations.106 Indeed, one wonders whether the
unintelligible consequences of the consent obligation might influence the
threshold determination of whether Google ‘‘collects, uses or discloses”
personal information.

(ii) The accuracy and use limitation obligations
If the threshold tests are met Google would also be bound to the accuracy
and use limitation obligations described in Section 2. Individuals would have a
103
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SOR/2001-7 (13 Dec 2001) at s. 1 (emphasis added).
It may also be possible to rely on the exemption for personal information ‘‘whose
collection is clearly in the interests of the individual and consent cannot be obtained in a
timely way” in some cases, but such an approach would seem to stretch a plain reading of
the phrase ‘‘clearly in the interests of the individual”.
Austin (2006), supra note 19 at 28.
Ibid at 28-29.
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corresponding right under PIPEDA to challenge Google on the accuracy and
completeness of their personal information.107
The scope of the accuracy and use limitation obligations are ultimately
determined by the purpose ascribed by a Canadian court to Google’s collection,
use or disclosure of personal information. A broader interpretation of Google’s
purpose would permit more collection, use or disclosure of information and
narrow — or eliminate — a right to be forgotten.
One option would be for a Canadian court to follow the EU Court in
ascribing a predominantly economic purpose to Google search. Under this
approach, search results that contain out-dated, distortive, or extraneous
personal information may not be necessary to meeting Google’s economic
objective in that they arguably have no impact on Google’s advertising sales,
market share or ability to channel users to other Google products. In such a case,
Google would be under an obligation to cease collecting, using, or disclosing the
personal information — i.e., delete the search results. To return to an example
cited earlier in the paper, under this analysis the Google search results linking to
a teacher’s past as an actor in erotic films could be seen as excessive in that they
do not advance the company’s economic position.
As discussed in the inquiry into whether Google search met the
commerciality requirement, an alternative view of Google’s search function is
that the economic function is only part of the company’s broader corporate
mission ‘‘to organize the world’s information.”108 This description implicitly
incorporates the use of personal information not only by Google but of internet
users that seek personal information for a variety of reasons109 — who are
largely sidelined in the economic perspective. On this broader account, seemingly
irrelevant or excessive personal information might be viewed as necessary to
Google’s purpose of making all information accessible to internet users. Thus the
search results containing personal information of the teacher’s past are simply a
consequence of cataloguing the internet; if internet users do not view the
material, it will fade from search results. The key problem with this perspective is
that the purpose potentially justifies an infinite collection of personal information
(subject to PIPEDA’s reasonableness test110), despite the stated principle in
PIPEDA in favour of ‘‘limiting collection”.
This discussion reinforces the point made above that PIPEDA is somewhat
incongruous to the operations of a search engine. It is difficult to predict how a
court might react to this challenge. What is clear, in my view, is that freedom of
expression will weigh heavily in defining the scope of the obligations.
107
108
109
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See PIPEDA, supra note 14 at Sch 1, s. 4.9.
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(iii) Freedom of expression
Section 2(b) of the Charter states that ‘‘everyone. . .has the freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other
media of communication.”111 Charter jurisprudence establishes that freedom of
expression attaches to those activities that convey a meaning,112 and ‘‘protects
readers and listeners as well as writers and speakers.” 113 Those seeking the
protection of s. 2(b) must show that their activity promotes one of three
rationales for freedom of expression protections: truth seeking; participation in
democratic decision-making; and self-fulfillment and personal autonomy. 114 The
recognition under PIPEDA of some form of right to be forgotten — whether
through the consent obligation or accuracy and use limitation obligations —
would undoubtedly infringe s. 2(b): webpage originators whose websites are
‘‘delinked” from Google would be impeded from reaching (i.e., conveying
meaning to) internet users;115 internet users would be restricted in the content
they could read or view; and, depending on how the court characterizes Google’s
role in information dissemination, Google would be hindered from providing
‘‘structured profiles” on individuals and/or transmitting expressive content to
internet users.116 As rights guaranteed by the Charter are not absolute, the key
question thus revolves around determining the circumstances, if any, under
which a right to be forgotten could be demonstrably justifiable under s. 1.
In Alberta Privacy Commissioner, a unanimous Supreme Court struck down
Alberta’s Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA)117 in its entirety on the
grounds that it infringed freedom of expression. 118 The Alberta Privacy
111
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
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See Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Que´bec (Procureur ge´ne´ral), 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989
CarswellQue 115, (sub nom. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)) [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, [1989] S.C.J. No. 36 (S.C.C.) [Irwin Toy].
R. v. National Post, 2010 SCC 16, 2010 CarswellOnt 2776, 2010 CarswellOnt 2777, [2010]
1 S.C.R. 477, [2010] S.C.J. No. 16 (S.C.C.) at para. 28.
Irwin Toy, supra note 112 at para. 53. See also Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, 2009
CarswellOnt 7956, 2009 CarswellOnt 7957, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640, [2009] S.C.J. No. 61
(S.C.C.) at para. 47 [Torstar].
In Newton, Abella J advanced a related but more general argument about the
relationship between information dissemination and website interconnectivity by
declaring that ‘‘the Internet cannot, in short, provide access to information without
hyperlinks”: Newton, supra note 18 at para. 36.
Even if Google’s search engine is characterized as a strictly economic operation, s. 2(b) of
the Charter protects commercial speech: see Ford c. Que´bec (Procureur ge´ne´ral), 1988
CarswellQue 155, 1988 CarswellQue 155F, (sub nom. Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General))
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, [1988] S.C.J. No. 88 (S.C.C.) at para. 59.
Personal Information Protection Act, R.S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5. The legislation is the
provincial equivalent to PIPEDA: see Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
‘‘Substantially similar provincial legislation” (2013), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/
leg_c/legislation/ss_index_e.asp>.
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Commissioner had determined that in recording and publicizing individuals that
crossed a picket line, the union collected, used and disclosed personal
information in breach of PIPA.119 The court held that because the recordings
furthered the union’s interests in a labour dispute, PIPA violated the union’s
freedom of expression.120 Although the privacy interests protected by PIPA had
a ‘‘quasi-constitutional” nature rooted in the relationship between ‘‘individual
autonomy, dignity and privacy” and democracy,121 the Court found that the
legislation was overbroad and disproportionate relative to the impact on the
union’s freedom of expression in the labour dispute context — which lay at the
‘‘core” of s. 2(b) — and thus could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.122
Alberta Privacy Commissioner is not immediately applicable to this inquiry as
the Supreme Court distinguished Alberta’s PIPA from PIPEDA: PIPEDA is
restricted to regulating ‘‘commercial activity”, whereas PIPA established a
‘‘general rule”.123 Nevertheless, these cases are instructive for the significant
weight they attach to freedom of expression vis-à-vis privacy interests.
In my view, a court could adopt one of two approaches with regards to the
relationship between freedom of expression and a right to be forgotten. A court
may deem all search results containing personal information, and the internet
search function generally, to be an essential part of truth-seeking and democratic
debate in the information age. This approach would conclude that it is
impossible to classify search results by their contribution to truth-seeking and
democratic debate, and in fact, attempting to do so would undermine these
objectives. An interpretation of PIPEDA that gives rise to a right to be forgotten
would violate the core of s. 2(b) and be disproportionate to the privacy interests
protected. The outcome of this approach would be that no consent or accuracy
and use limitation obligations would attach to Google search results.
Alternatively, a court may reason that PIPEDA demands a case-by-case
analysis of the privacy interests relative to the impact on freedom of expression.
Search results associated with a person’s name can be sorted by their promotion
of truth-seeking and democratic discourse. For example, search results
containing links to news articles and other forms of media communication
might be considered to prima facie further these objectives (there may be
exceptions in limited cases). As the Supreme Court stated in Torstar,
‘‘[p]roductive debate is dependent on the free flow of information [and] the
118
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Alberta Privacy Commissioner, supra note 16 at para. 40.
Ibid at para. 4.
Ibid at para. 17.
Ibid at para. 19.
Ibid at para. 28.
Ibid at para. 15. But see Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Factum of the Intervener —
In the matter of the Information and Privacy Commissioner and Attorney General of
Alberta and United Food And Commercial Workers, Local 401” (2013) at para. 30,
online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/leg_c/factum/01_ufcw_e.asp> (expressing concern
about constitutional effect on PIPEDA of striking down Alberta’s PIPA).
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vital role of the communications media in providing a vehicle for such debate is
explicitly recognized in the text of s. 2(b) itself.”124 But other types of search
results may only have minimal benefits for truth-seeking and democratic
discourse. In such cases, the sensitivity of the search results may serve to limit the
personal autonomy and self-fulfillment of the person subject to the search,
undermining the third rationale of freedom of expression.125 These search results
lie outside the core of that protected by s. 2(b), making the infringement
proportionate to the quasi-constitutional privacy interests protected by the
legislation. Search results that fall into this category might include, for example,
material that was posted by an individual, removed, but reproduced without that
individual’s consent;126 and social media or internet profile websites.127 The
result of the second approach would be the recognition of a version of a right to
be forgotten (through the consent or accuracy and use limitation obligations)
that is significantly narrower than that formulated in Google Spain.

IV. CONCLUSION
This paper suggests that a right to be forgotten is not as foreign to Canadian
law as it may seem.128 The substantive obligations mandated in PIPEDA
resemble those in the European Directive and provide a legislative framework for
a similar finding in Canada. However, the Supreme Court’s determination in
Newton that website hyperlinks do not constitute control over content suggests
that Canadian courts may reject the EU Court’s assertion in Google Spain that
search engines ‘‘collect” or ‘‘disclose” personal information. Moreover, the
impractical consequences of finding that PIPEDA applies to Google may lead a
court to dismiss a claim at the threshold stage. Finally, the right to be forgotten
would likely be significantly narrowed — if not defeated — by the Supreme
Court’s emphasis on freedom of expression relative to privacy rights, as seen in
Alberta Privacy Commissioner.
This paper has also demonstrated that the privacy frameworks are not
particularly well-suited to technologies that process personal information in nontraditional ways. This is not surprising given the Directive was implemented in
124
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1995, PIPEDA in 2001, and both reflect Fair Information Practices developed in
the late 1970s. The consent-based model and the ‘‘all-or-nothing” approach of
PIPEDA in particular leads to significant interpretive challenges that may
actually undermine privacy rights.
Responding to the impact of rapid technological change on privacy, in April
2016 the European Parliament enacted a new Directive.129 Article 17 of the
Directive expressly enshrines a right to be forgotten. It remains unclear whether
the new Directive will trigger changes globally. At this point, the only certainty is
a continued vigorous debate over the right to be forgotten.
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Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ, L 119.

PIPEDA (Canada)

‘‘Applies to every organization in respect of personal
information that . . . collects, uses or discloses in the course of
commercial activities” [s. 4(1)(a)]
‘‘Commercial activity”: ‘‘any particular transaction, act or
conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a
commercial character, including the selling, bartering or
leasing of donor, membership or other fundraising lists” [s. 2]

‘‘Each Member State shall apply [the Directive] to the
processing of personal data where. . . the processing is carried
out in the context of activities of an establishment of the
controller on the territory of the Member State” [Art. 4(1)(a)]

‘‘Controller”: legal person. . .which alone or jointly with others ‘‘organization” includes an association, a partnership, a person
determines the purposes and means of the processing of
and a trade union [s. 2]
personal data. . .” [Art. 2(c)]

‘‘This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automatic means. . .” [Art. 3(1)]

‘‘Processing of personal data”: ‘‘any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or
not by automatic means, such as collection, recording,
organisation, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval,
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination,
blocking, erasure or destruction. [Art. 2(b)]

‘‘Personal data”: ‘‘any information relating to an identified or ‘‘Personal information”: ‘‘information about an identifiable
identifiable natural person. . .”[Art. 2(a)]
individual, but does not include the name, title or business
address or telephone number of an organization” [s. 2]

Threshold questions — applicability and jurisdiction

Directive 95/46/EC (European Union)
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‘‘This Part does not apply to. . .any organization in respect of
personal information that the organization collects, uses or
discloses for journalistic, artistic or literary purposes and does
not collect, use or disclose for any other purpose” [Art. 4(1)(c)]

‘‘Member States shall provide for exemptions or derogations
. . . for the processing of personal data carried out solely for
journalistic purposes or for the purpose of artistic or literary
expression only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to
privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression” [Art 9]

‘‘Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and upto-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be
used” [Sch. 1, s. 4.6]
‘‘The collection of information shall be limited to that which is
necessary for the purposes identified by the organization.”
[Sch. 1, s. 4.4]

Personal data ‘‘must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purposes for which they are collected” and
‘‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every
reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which are
inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for
which they were collected. . .are erased and rectified” [Art. 6(d)]

‘‘Organizations shall not collect personal information indiscriminately” [Sch. 1, s. 4.4]

‘‘Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for
purposes other than those for which it was collected. . .Personal
information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the
fulfillment of those purposes.” [Sch. 1, s. 4.5]

‘‘The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for
the collection, use or disclosure of personal information, except
where inappropriate” [Sch. 1, s. 4.3]
‘‘an organization may collect personal information without the
knowledge of consent of the individual only if. . . the
information is publicly available and is specified by the
regulations [s. 7(1)]

‘‘Personal data may be processed [without consent of the data
subject] only if . . . processing is necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the controller. . .except
where such interests are overridden by the interests [or]
fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. . .” [Art.
7(f)]

Substantial obligations and rights
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‘‘When an individual successfully demonstrates the inaccuracy
or incompleteness of personal information, the organization
shall amend the information as required. Depending upon the
nature of the information challenged, amendment involves the
correction, deletion or addition of information” [Sch 1, s. 4.9.5]
‘‘Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the
existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information
and shall be given access to that information. An individual
shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the
information and have it amended as appropriate” [Sch. 1, s.
4.9]

‘‘Member states shall grant the data subject the right. . .at least
in the cases referred to in Article 7(e) and (f), to object at any
time on compelling legitimate grounds relating to his particular
situation” [Art 14]

‘‘An organization may collect, use or disclose personal
information only for purposes that a reasonable person would
consider are appropriate in the circumstances” [s. 5(3)]

PIPEDA (Canada)

‘‘A right to obtain from the controller. . .as appropriate the
rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of
which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in
particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the
data” (Art. 12)

Directive 95/46/EC (European Union)
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